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STATE V. DELAURIER*: PRIVACY RIGHTS AND
CORDLESS TELEPHONES -

THE FOURTH

AMENDMENT IS PUT ON HOLD
In response to Supreme Court decisions1 placing electronic
eavesdropping' within the scope of fourth amendment protection,
Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968." Title III prohibits the interception' and dis* 488 A.2d 688 (R.I.1985).
1. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 247 (1967) (federal agents' interception
of conversation inside a phone booth without prior judicial authorization constituted
an illegal search and seizure within the manner of the fourth amendment); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (state wiretap statute which does not require a showing
of probable cause held unconstitutional). In Katz, the Court held that the fourth
amendment protects people, and not places, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. Thus, the requirement that a physical trespass into a
given enclosure be made before electronic surveillance could come within fourth
amendment protection, as doctrinated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928), was repudiated. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. After the Olnstead decision, the permissibility of electronic eavesdropping came full circle until the Katz court overruled
Olmstead's holding that electronic surveillance without physical entry is not a search.
Compare Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (wiretapping is a federal
crime and its gathered information is inadmissible in federal courts) with Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) (state courts are free to admit evidence obtained through
wiretapping), and TO AMEND THE WIRETAPPING LAWS, HEARINGS
BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 1 OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON H.R. 2266 AND H.R. 3099, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1941) (any person
may tap telephone lines and act on the information obtained so long as he does not
divulge or publish what he hears).
2. The terms electronic eavesdropping and electronic surveillance are used synonymously in this article. Both terms are used to describe what one commentator
has referred to as "any means by which a third person, aided by an electronic or
electrical instrument, overhears a conversation between two other persons." J. CARR,
THE LAW Or ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 2, 1.01 (1977). The term wiretap, as generally
understood and used in this article, refers to the "interception of wire communications, most frequently, telephone communications." Id. at 1, 1.01(1)(a). For a history
of electronic eavesdropping and its use by government, see generally S. DASH, THE
EAVESDROPPERS (1959).
3. In full, the fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searches, and the persons to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102520 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 802, 82
Stat. 212) [hereinafter referred to as Title III]. The two goals of Title III are: 1) to
protect the privacy of wire and oral communications; and 2) to delineate on a uniform
basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of such communications may be authorized. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:1087

closure of wire 6 or oral 7 communications without a court order. In
State v. Delaurier, the Rhode Island Supreme Court analyzed the
technology of cordless telephones 9 to decide whether Title III safeguards would protect their use. Relying primarily on a strict interpretation of the statute,10 the court held that communications which
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2122, 2153.

. 5. Title III defines interception as "the aural acquisition of the contents of any
wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1982). Any device or apparatus that can intercept wire
or oral communications is covered under the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (1982). The
only stipulated exceptions are telephone or telegraph instruments used in the ordinary course of business by a common carrier, its subscriber, or a law enforcement
officer, and hearing aids which do not bring hearing to better than normal. Id. See
also J. CARR, supra note 2 at 3.02(3).
6. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 defines
a wire communication as
...any communication made in whole or in part through the use of facilities
for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or
operated by any person engaged as common carrier in providing or operating
such facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable
or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception
furnished or operated by any person engaged as common carrier in providing
or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign
communications.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)(1982).
7. An oral communication that falls within the scope of Title III is one that is
"uttered by a person exhibiting an exception that such communication is not subject
to interception under circumstances justifying such exception." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2)
(1982). This language reflects the holding in Katz that the electronic eavesdropping
of the suspect in that case "violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied."
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, expanded the justifiable reliance theory with a twofold requirement: "First, that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'." Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). This two-pronged test has been adopted by the Court in subsequent illegal
search cases. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). But cf. Falkow, Electronic Surveillance: Protection of Privacy Expectations in Participant Monitoring
Cases, ANN. SURv. Am. L. 55, 57 (1984, vol. 1) (discussing courts which have applied
the broader, exclusively objective standard of the Katz majority opinion and ignoring
the subjective prong of the Harlan test).
8. 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985).
9. A cordless telephone typically consists of a base station and a roving unit.
The base station is connected to the local phone company exchange via a cable
plugged into a standard telephone jack wall outlet in a manner identical to the way in
which a regular telephone would be connected. The roving unit accommodates the
earpiece and mouthpiece, and usually the dialing mechanism, connecting to the base
station by means of a small radio transmitter in the handset. By design, its low power
signal enables the cordless phone to operate only within a limited area, with an average maximum range of about 300 feet between the roving unit and base station. A
cordless telephone is thus distinguished from a common landline telephone where the
receiver and base are connected by wires and are together connected to the common
carrier transmission lines. See 49 Fed. Reg. 8, 1512 (1984).
10. The Rhode Island court did, however, cite three cases as relevant case law
pertaining to warrantless surveillance of radio-assisted telephone conversations:
United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973) (conversations over automobile
radio-telephones constitute wire communications and therefore are within the scope
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involve a cordless telephone do not fall within the scope of Title
III." The court was additionally burdened with having to interpret a
statute that did not specifically consider the technology which was
the focus of this action.1 2 Consequently, police in Rhode Island may
conduct surveillances of such communications without court authority or supervision.
The Delaurier decision has its origins in a Woonsocket, Rhode
Island police station. On November 2, 1983, a local housewife called
the station to report that she had overheard a conversation involving a man who was discussing the sale of drugs.13 Her son had been
playing with the dial of her AM radio and had tuned into a frequency which was carrying her neighbor Leo Delaurier's cordless
telephone signals.14 Detectives dispatched to her house reported that
they heard an unanswered telephone ringing over her radio, which
was still tuned to that frequency.15 The police station captain then
ordered that the station's AM radio be taken to a location near the
area where the report was made and detectives were assigned to
monitor the radio for illegal drug transactions."s
Over several weeks, the police recorded conversations involving
the sale of marijuana and cocaine, gambling, and prostitution.17 The
police identified the recorded voice as Delaurier's. s On December
16, 1983, these recordings were submitted to a district court judge,
of Title III regulation); Dorsey v. State, 402 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1981) (Title III does not
require a court order to intercept messages transmitted by phone to a rented "pocketpager"); State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984) (cordless phone conversations are part oral communications, with the oral communication outside the protection of Title II1).
Of the three cases cited above, only Howard involves the same technology as that
analyzed by the Delaurier court. The Dorsey court noted that it did "not reach any
hypothetical questions involving more sophisticated methods of intercepting communications which in fact engender a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as landline
telephone messages transmitted in part by wireless signals." Dorsey, 402 So.2d at
1184 n.4.
11. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 695.
12. Title III is the product of combining two bills introduced in 1967: The Federal Interception Act, S. 675, 90th Cong. 1st Seass. (1967) and the Electronic Surviellance Control Act of 1967, S. 2050, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1967). President Johnson
signed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, including Title III,
on June 19, 1968. The last amendment to Title III was in 1970, Act of Jan. 2, 1971,
Pub. L. No. 91-64, 20, 84 Stat. 1982. The earliest versions of cordless telephones,
however, did not appear on the market until 1973. Kobb, Untangling the Cordless
Phone, PEas. COM. TEcH., Apr. 1984. at 15.
13. Delaurier, 488 A.2d at 690.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Delaurier was apparently well known by several members of the Woonsocket police department. At the time of the surveillance, he was enjoying the freedom of a bail bond set in pending cases. Id.
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who issued arrest and search warrants. 19 At a subsequent bail-revocation hearing, testimony centering largely on the surreptitous recordings2" convinced the presiding justice to order Delaurier held
2
without bail. 1

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Delaurier's motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the monitoring and taping of his phone conversations was correctly denied.2 2 Focusing on the express provisions of
Title III, the court considered whether the evidence was within the
scope of the statute's exclusionary rule. 22 Because it was undisputed
that the Woonsocket police did not obtain judicial authority2 4 to
conduct the surveillance,25 the court turned to the definitional section of Title

11126

to support its conclusion that judicial authority is

not required to monitor and record conversations involving the use
2
of a cordless telephone.

19. Id.
20. At the time the recordings were made, Leo Delaurier was on bail on two
pending cases involving robbery and extortion. State v. Delaurier, No. P/2 83-409 at
35, (Providence R.I. Sup. Ct. Dec. 28, 1983). Arrest and search warrants were issued
on the basis of the recordings, but no other evidence was presented linking Delaurier
with the illegal activities which were the subject of his intercepted phone conversations. Id. The recordings were enough, however, to convince the justice presiding over
Delaurier's bail revocation hearing that "the conversations which were heard clearly
show, at the very least, an agreement or conversations concerning agreement to do
illegal things . . . So I think the State has established that Mr.Delaurier is in violation of his bail bond." Id. The issue of whether the recordings were legally obtained
became moot upon Delaurier's subsequent release on bail notwithstanding the alleged
error in his bail revocation hearing. Id. at 691 n.1. The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island addressed the merits of Delaurier's argument, however, for three reasons: the
admissibility of evidence at bail revocation hearings is likely to be a repetitious issue
that evades appellate review, given Rhode Island's 90 day limit between the time of
incarceration for bail violation and the trial on the charge upon which the bail was
revoked; the substantial public interest in the issue presented; and to provide guidance for the lower court when facing the same issue at the trials of the several other
persons arrested and charged as the result of the investigation. Id.
21. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 691.
22. Id. at 695.
23. Title III's exclusionary rule states that:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a state, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982).
24. Due to the extensive invasion of privacy with communication surveillance,
Congress included a number of procedural and substantive safeguards more restrictive than an ordinary search warrant. C. FISHMAN, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING
14 (1978). The provisions for authorization and use of intercepted wire or oral communications can be found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-2518 (1982).
25. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 692.
26. 18. U.S.C. § 2510 (1982).
27. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 692.
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The court found that Delaurier's conversation was not a wire
communication"8 and, therefore, not within the meaning of Title
Although the court recognized that Title III defines a wire
communication as one made "in part . . . by aid of wire", s0 it con111.29

cluded that applying this language in cases involving cordless telephones would produce an "absurd result" not within congressional
intent.3 2 The court reasoned that the communication which the roving unit transmitted to the base station was a radio transmission
and, therefore, was not to be given the same definitional value as the
communication which the base station transmitted through the telephone lines.33 Interference with the radio portion of the transmission could not be viewed as interference with a wire communication.
After deciding that Delaurier's conversation was not a wire communication, the court briefly addressed the issue of whether it qualified as an oral communication"' under Title III."8 A subjective, justifiable expectation of privacy must exist before an oral
communication is included within Title III's statutory and. regulatory framework. 6 The Delauriercourt held that because the owner's
manual for Delaurier's telephone warned the user that, due to its
nature, privacy was not assured,' any expectations of privacy with
the use of a cordless phone were not justifiable.8
In its final analysis, the court reasoned that even if Delaurier's
conversation could be characterized as an oral communication, it
was not "intercepted" 9 within the meaning of Title

111.40

A mechan-

ical, electronic, or other device must be employed before an inter28. For a definition of wire communication, see supra note 6.
29. Delaurier,499 A.2d at 694.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1982).
31. The "absurd result" referred to by the court was taken from a characterization of a federal court's own decision which held that use of a mobile radio-telephone
could be a wire communication within definition of Title III. United States v. Hall,
488 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1973). The "in part ... by aid of wire" language of the
definition forced the court to conclude that if one party to the conversation is using a
regular telephone, the entire conversation is a wire communication. Id. The absurdity, the court goes on to state, is that this type of communication should logically be
afforded no more protection than a communication between two radio-telephones. Id.
But see infra note 57 and accompanying text.
32. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 693-94.
33. Id. at 693.
34. For a definition or oral communication, see supra note 7.
35. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 694.
36. Id. See supra note 7.
37. Federal law requires cordless telephones to carry the warning that, among
other things, "privacy of communications may not be insured when using this phone."
Federal Communication Commission, 47 C.F.R. § 15.236 (1985).
38. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 694. See State v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197
(1984).
39. For a definition of interception, see supra note 5.
40. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 694.
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ception violative of Title III provisions occurs."1 The court con-

cluded that Congress could not have intended that a standard AM
radio be considered a "device" under the statute. 2 The police,
therefore, did not need a court order to listen to a standard radio
that received Delaurier's telephone conversations.
According to the Rhode Island Supreme Court's interpretation
of Title III, police may conduct surveillances of indefinite duration
without probable cause, court supervision, or the need to obtain a
search warrant on the millions'8 of persons who choose to use a particular type of telephone in their homes or offices." A proper interpretation of Title III would subject police monitoring of a cordless
telephone communication to the same strict guidelines which control
other types of telephone eavesdropping. 4" This would more accurately reflect the goals of Title 11146 as well as the intent of the
fourth amendment.' 7 Instead, Delaurier exemplifies the decisional
errors that occur when a court attempts to apply law to a technology
the court does not fully comprehend.
In the context of electronic surveillance and fourth amendment
interpretation, a classic example of this form of judicial error is
found in Olmstead v. United States."' Although by 1928 the telephone was becoming a well established necessity for home and business, the United States Supreme Court majority in Olmstead did
41. 18 U.S.C. § 25.10 (4-5) (1982).
42. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 694-95.
43. In mid 1984, six to eight million cordless telephones were in use with another ten million predicted to be sold by year's end. Kobb, Untangling The Cordless
Phone, PERs. CoM. TECH., Apr. 1984, at 41.

44. The popularity and general acceptance of cordless telephones suggest they
are more than an aberration or a novelty. In certain situations, (for example providing immediate access to a telephone for a wheelchair-bound individual) a cordless
telephone may be just as important and necessary as a landline telephone.
45. See supra note 21. See also ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE - STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 137-40 (Approved Draft, 1971) (a discussion of probable cause requirements for electronic surveillance warrants).
46. For a discussion of Congress' twin goals for Title III see supra note 4.
47. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
48. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Roy Olmstead was a Seattle bootlegger who had an
operation large enough to attract the attention of federal prohibition agents. W. MuRPHY, WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL:

A

CASE STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

16 (1965). Several

months worth of evidence acquired during secret wiretap monitoring of Olmstead's
home and office telephones was used to convict Olmstead in federal court of violating
the Volstead Act. Id. In answer to the assertion that the unauthorized wiretaps constituted a fourth amendment violation, the majority opinion for the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that:
It]he purpose of the amendment is to prevent the invasion of homes and offices
and the seizure of incriminating evidence found therein. Whatever may be said
of tapping of telephone wires as an unethical intrusion upon the privacy of
persons who are suspected of crime, it is not an act which comes within the
letter of the prohibition of constitutional provisions.
Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 1927).
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not properly view this technology in light of basic constitutional
principles.' The Olmstead court acknowledged that science has enabled communication to take place without a tangible, material courier or the physical presence of communicants.50 Yet the Court could
not conceptualize a fourth amendment violation that lacked either a
seizure of a tangible item or a search without a physical presence."
It was almost forty years before the Court properly applied fourth
amendment principles to telephone technology."2
In a manner similar to Olmstead, the Delaurier court gave insufficient consideration to fourth amendment principles which are
embodied in Title III. Instead, the court applied technologically incorrect interpretations of the terms "wire communications," "oral
communications," and "interception" to the technology of cordless
telephones.5 8 Consequently, the Delauriercourt denies users of cordless telephones the protection logically afforded to them by the
fourth amendment.
The Delaurier court held that Delaurier's conversation was not
a wire communication because the portion of the communication
that was intercepted was not carried by wires.54 In so holding, the
Delauriercourt misunderstood both legislative intent and the function of cordless telephones. The legislative history of Title III emphasizes that the definition of wire communication55 is intended "to
include all communications carried by a common carrier, in whole or
in part, through our nation's communications network."56 A cordless
49. The Olmstead court stated:
The [Fourth] amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the
sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of
the defendants ... The languages of the amendment cannot be extended and

expanded to include telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or
office any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-65.
50. Id. at 465.
51. Id. at 466. This physical presence requirement of Olmstead, referred to as
the Trespass Doctrine, inevitably produced incongruous decisions as electronic surveillance techniques grew more sophisticated. Compare Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (microphone placed against outside wall of room was allowed
because it presented "no logical or reasonable distinction" from actions in Olmstead)
with Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (spike microphone penetrating
5/16ths of an inch into a room constituted a trespass in violation of the fourth
amendment).
52. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In overruling Olmstead, the
Katz court acknowledged that illegal search and seizure can occur without a physical
intrusion or confiscation of intangible items. Id. at 353.
53. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
54. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 693.
55. For the Title III definition of wire communication, see supra note 6.
56. S.REP.No. 1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2178 (1968).
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telephone, by definition, falls within that category.57 Nevertheless,
the Delauriercourt ignored the express legislative intent of Title III

and excluded cordless telephones from the statute's protection to
avoid the possibility of "absurd results." 5
In so doing, the court overlooked the absurdity of its rationale.

A cross-country call originating from a telephone connected through
a wire to a wall jack and using the nation's communications network
coast to coast is afforded Title III protection against warrantless
eavesdropping. That same cross-country call, according to Delaurier,

would not be protected if the caller chose to use a cordless telephone
to transmit through that same wall jack from an adjoining room.

The right to be secure in one's person and house against unreasonable searches and seizures" should not be cast aside simply because
technology untethered us from our telephones. 60 The Delaurier
court, like the Court in Olmstead," obscured the intent of the
fourth amendment in its confusion over a technological
advancement.
The Delauriercourt, in its confusion over the technical capabil57. A cordless telephone uses the same carrier facilities as any other telephone
from the point of the base station located inside the caller's house to the party at the
other end. See supra note 9.
58. Delaurier,488 A.2d 693. The absurd results the court referred to is an analogy to United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973). The Hall court, after admitting that the language of Title III protects mobile telephone conversations, said
that this interpretation gives protection to persons using a mobile telephone to call a
landline telephone, but not when he calls another mobile telephone because no wires
are being used. Id. at 197. This is a misunderstanding of how a mobile telephone
works. Signals are not sent and received from telephone to telephone, but rather are
sent and received through base stations which in turn use normal carrier lines to
either connect to a landline telephone or to another base station. The wires that the
Hall court places so much emphasis on are present in either method. Id.
The Hall and Delaurier courts confuse the capabilities of cordless telephones
and mobile telephones with pure radio-type communication systems. Cf. Goodall's
Charter Bus Serv., Inc. v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 125 Cal. App.3d 194, 178
Cal. Rptr. 21 (1981) (interception of two-way radio system signals between school bus
and dispatcher); Chandler v. State, 366 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1978) (interception of signals
between two walkie-talkies), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 1979), aff'd, 449 U.S.
560 (1981).
The Hall court correctly uses the significance of whether the signal passes
through a common carrier's wires as the deciding factor in determining a wire communication. However, if this element is not present, even communications made entirely by wire do not fall under the Title III definition. See e.g., United States v.
Christman, 375 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (definition of wire communications does not encompass an in-house intercom system.).
59.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

60. Just as the invention of the telephone freed persons from having to leave
their house to communicate with someone across town, so does the cordless telephone
free persons from having to remain in designated places to use the telephone. As
cordless telephone technology improves, conventional wired telephones may soon be
obsolete. Kobb, Untangling the Cordless Phone, PERS. CoM. Ta.Ci., Apr. 1984, at 41.
61, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). For a discussion of the
Olmstead decision, see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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ities of a cordless telephone as compared to those of other communication devices, erred when it turned to Title III's definition of oral
communication.1 2 The court first correctly noted that an oral communicant must have a subjective and justifiable expectation of privacy." The court then concluded that the broadcast nature of a cordless telephone belies any justifiable privacy expectations." ' What
the court did not consider was the extremely limited transmission
range of cordless telephones and how that affects a user's expectation of privacy.
Under ideal conditions, the average maximum range of use for a
cordless telephone is 300 feet. 6 Just as a subscriber to a party line
may reasonably set his expectations of privacy within certain parameters,66 so may a user of a cordless telephone reasonably assume
his conversations will not go beyond his few close neighbors within
the telephone's limited range. The legislative history of Title III
emphasizes that the place where the conversation occurs is an important factor in determining whether the speaker's expectation of
privacy is justifiable.6 " The Delaurier court, however, chose not to
consider the generally accepted notion that one's home is the most
reasonable place to expect to carry on private conversations."
Because the court could not comfortably rest its conclusion on
the "expectation of privacy" reasoning,70 the court shifted its focus
62. For Title III's definition of oral communication, see supra note 7.
63. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 694 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1982)).
64. Id. The court mostly relied on the fact that an owner's manual which comes
with the telephone carries a mandatory FCC warning that eavesdropping can occur.
See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
65. Kobb, Untangling The Cordless Phone, PERS. COM. TECH., Apr. 1984, at 15.
Unlike cellular or mobile radio telephones, the cordless telephones transmit a signal
less than 500 feet. Federal Communications Commission, 47 C.F.R. § 15.2333(c)
(1985).
66. Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968) (police may not intercept a conversation
on a party line even though the participants know other subscribers may be listening). See also United States v. San Martin, 469 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1972) (using the telephone of a party line subscriber with permission does not authorize police to intercept conversations of non-consensual subscribers), cert. denied 410 U.S. 934 (1973).
67. Because the practice of monitoring cordless telephone calls is illegal, a user
should have a justifiable expectation that his neighbors (or the police) will not break
the law within the telephone's limited range. See Federal Communications Commission, 47 C.F.R. 15.11 (1985).
68. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2178.
69. For prior expectation of privacy reasoning, see Steagald v. United States,
451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981). See also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
(greater expectation of privacy in a dwelling place than in an automobile); Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (holding that the notion that the home is generally assumed to be private and free from unreasonable search and seizures is at the
heart of the fourth amendment). But cf. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)
(fourth amendment protection does not extend to open fields surrounding one's
house).
70. See Delaurier,488 A.2d at 694 n.4. The court admits that a person on the
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to the "interception" element of Title III. A proper interpretation of
Title III's definition of interception includes, with few exceptions,
any electronic device capable of accepting wire or oral communications. 7 ' A radio is an electronic device capable of accepting a wire or
oral communication. 72 Furthermore, a radio does not qualify for any
of the exemptions expressed in Title III.' s The court, however, refused to apply the clear language of Title III, reasoning that Congress could not have meant for an ordinary radio to fall within this
inclusive definition.7 4 A better understanding of the technology involved would necessitate the inquiry of when a radio ceases to be a
radio and becomes an eavesdropping device. More importantly, it is
the purpose for which something is used, not what it is, that should
control when Title III violations are encountered."
The court also erred when it described Delaurier's conversation
as an AM broadcast accessible to anyone possessing an AM radio.7"
The bandwidths which cordless telephones operate within are well
beyond the designated radio broadcast frequencies that many radios
are capable of receiving.7 7 Delaurier's broadcast actually was on a
other end of Delaurier's telephone conversations may have been unaware of his use of
a cordless telephone and may be justified in expecting privacy. The logical extension
of this notion, then, is that interception of Delaurier's calls was illegal because someone's reasonable and justifiable expectation of privacy was violated.
If the Delaurier court chose to address this issue at length, the notion of implied
consent could have entered into the proceedings. A court order is not required to
intercept communications when one of the parties to the conversation has given prior
consent to the interception. 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(c) (1982). Delaurier, by engaging in a
conversation that he knew was not private, could be said to have implied consent to
its interception. See Commonwealth v. Gullett, 459 P. 431, 436, 329 A.2d 513, 519
(1974), But cf. Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 1983) (consent under Title III is not to be cavalierly implied).
71. For Title III's definition of interception, see supra note 5.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (1982).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (a-b) (1982).
74. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 694-95.
75. Even an ordinary extension telephone, which is specifically excluded as a
device under 18 U.S.C. 2510(5), can become an eavesdropping device when it is not
used as intended. If the speaker element in the handset is removed (a simple, nonpermanent procedure that takes only a few seconds), the telephone becomes an eavesdropping device by definition. People v. Gervasi, 89 Ill.2d 522, 434 N.E.2d 1112
(1982).
76. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 694.
77. Radio frequencies which may be used for commercial broadcasts are assigned by federal law. AM radio broadcasts on the bandwidths between 535 kHz and
1605kHz on the frequency spectrum and FM radio broadcasts between 88 MHz and
108 MHz. 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (1985). Cordless telephones operate at both 49 MHz (below the FM broadcast band) and from 1625 kHz to 1800 kHz (above the AM broadcast band). 49 Fed. Reg. 8, 1512 (1984). The October 1, 1985 revised FCC guidelines
have eliminated the AM broadcast band from permissible operating frequencies for
the current models of cordless telephones. Federal Communications Commission, 47
C.F.R. § 15.232 (1985). The new telephones will operate in the 49 MHz band and the
recently released 46 MHz band. Id. This change is primarily the result of International Telecommunication Union decisions which call for expansion of AM broadcasting into the 1700 kHz band within a few years. Kobb, Untangling the Cordless
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spectrum located between the AM broadcast band and the 160meter amateur radio band. 78 Title III certainly was not intended to
prevent anyone from listening to an AM broadcast.7 9 Yet, when a
radio is intentionally tuned beyond any usable AM broadcast frequency for the purpose of monitoring private telephone conversations, it falls squarely within Title III's control.8 0 An electronic device should not escape Title III scrutiny simply because it can also
be used in a different, but law-abiding, manner.
The final reason the Delauriercourt erred in holding that the
interception of Delaurier's telephone conversation did not violate
Title III is more philosophical than technical. The fourth amendment was drafted in an effort to prevent government misconduct.81
It was an articulation of the resentment the framers of the Constitution had toward the writs of assistance and general warrants officers
of the crown used in their indiscriminate searches.8 2 Congress, when
enacting Title III, kept in mind this lack of particularity that the
framers abhorred. 3 The Delaurier court, by interpreting the language of Title III to exclude cordless telephones, ignored these principles underlying the fourth amendment. According to Delaurier,
police can intercept calls made on cordless telephones and are under
no restraint or guidelines as to basic fourth amendment standards
such as probable cause, minimization, and duration.8 As cordless
telephones become more common, the possibilities of constitutional
Phone, PERS. Com. TECH., Apr. 1984, at 15. The government thus continues to allocate
frequency spectrums for private communications separate and distinct from those
designated for commercial broadcast use.
78. This is what one commentator describes as "radio outer limits." Kobb, Untangling The Cordless Phone, PERS. COM. TECH., Apr. 1984, at 15.
79. Delaurier,488 A.2d at 694.
80. Title III's exclusionary rule is not limited to evidence which is intentionally
intercepted. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1982). Criminal sanctions, however, apply only to intentional activities. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)-(d) (1982). The court should not find sanctions against eavesdropping absurd because the law is clear on this matter. Delaurier,
488 A.2d at 694. See Federal Communications Commission, 47 C.F.R. § 15.11 (1985)
(prohibition against eavesdropping). Compare State ex rel. Flournoy v. Wren, 108
Ariz. 356, 360-61, 498 P.2d 444, 448 (1972) (conversation inadvertently overheard by
motel switchboard operator found not to violate Title III) with State v. Dwyer, 120
Ariz. 291, 294, 585 P.2d 900, 903 (1978) (telephone operator listening for fifteen minutes was not an inadvertent interception and violates Title III).
81. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (the core rationale for the
exclusionary rule is to deter police from violations of constitutional protections not
withstanding the cost of letting obviously guilty persons go unpunished).
82. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 30 (1966).
83. SEN. REP. No. 1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 21612162.
84. For a general discussion of fourth amendment standards relating to electronic surveillance, see Cranwell, Judicial Fine-tuning of Electronic Surveillance, 6
SETON HALL L. REV. 225 (1975). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356
(1967) (limitations regarding electronic surveillance, such as maximum duration of
time allowed for surveillance and court guidelines as to when surveillance should be
allowed).
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violations increase. With Delaurier as precedent, random monitoring of telephone conversations may become a routine law enforcement activity for the police unit on patrol. The Delaurierholding, in
effect, limits the right to be free from warrantless searches by electronic eavesdropping to only those willing to sacrifice technological
advances in communications.
The fact that the Woonsocket police sat outside of Delaurier's
house and amassed one hundred hours of eavesdropping 5 over several weeks without need of a court order suggests a gap in either the
law or the court's reasoning. In response to what may be a gap in the
law, a bill has recently been introduced in Congress 0 which in part
would change Title III's definition of wire communication to more
precisely include communication devices such as cordless telephones.87 The gaps in judicial reasoning, however, will have a
profound impact on the growing number of persons who will be
without legal redress for violations of their constitutional rights because they choose to take advantage of certain technological advances offered in a modern society.
The Delauriercourt attempted to legitimatize the Woonsocket
police department's actions with a strained interpretation of Title
III. The words of Title III, however, frame underlying fourth
amendment principles that allow the intent of the statute to be clear
even as technology changes the circumstances. It took the Supreme
Court almost forty years to acknowledge that fourth amendment
protection should not be denied to telephone users simply because
technology changed the way people communicate. 8 Now that technology has changed the type of telephones people use, the courts
should be flexible enough to interpret the law to accommodate those
technological advances. A better understanding of the technology in
question, by both court and counsel, will help avoid the factually
erroneous analysis which in this case precluded constitutional pro85. Freedom But No Privacy On Cordless Phone, PRIVACY J., Jan. 1984, at 10.
86. H.R. 3378, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
87. Under the proposed bill, the term "wire communication" would be amended
to "electronic communication ... [which] means any transmission of signs, signals,
writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, or photoelectric system... " H.R. 3378, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. at 101(a)(1)(1985). But see, Testimony on H.R. 3378 Before the Subcommittee
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice 99th Cong. 2nd Sess. 5-6
(Mar. 5, 1986)(statement of James Knapp, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice) (recommendation that radio transmission portion
of cordless telephones not be subject to Title III unless signals are encrypted).
88. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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tection for a user of technologically advanced communication
system.
Donald Battaglia

